AKERS v. CITY OF OAK GROVE, WD 65220 (Mo.App.W.D. 11-14-2006)


RANDOLPH AKERS and KELLY AKERS, Respondents v. CITY OF OAK GROVE, MISSOURI, Appellant.

No. WD 65220Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
November 14, 2006

[EDITORS’ NOTE: THIS OPINION WAS WITHDRAWN ON DECEMBER 19, 2006.]

Appeal from Jackson County Circuit Court, Honorable W. Stephen Nixon.

Steve Majors, Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.

Jason K. Rew, Blue Springs, Missouri, Scott A. Hunter, Co-Counsel, Kansas City, Missouri, for respondents.

Before Breckenridge, P.J., Howard and Newton, JJ.

BRECKENRIDGE, J.

The City of Oak Grove appeals the judgment of the trial court entered on the jury’s verdict against it and in favor of Randolph and Kelly Akers on their claim of inverse condemnation. On appeal, the City claims that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and new trial, in adding prejudgment interest to the jury’s verdict, and in refusing its proffered converse jury instruction. The City also claims that it is entitled to reversal of the judgment because of cumulative errors committed by the court.

AFFIRMED, IN PART, REVERSED, IN PART, AND REMANDED

Division I holds:

(1) The issue of the submissibility of the Akers’ case is not preserved for appellate review because the City failed to file a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(2) The trial court erred in adding prejudgment interest to the jury’s verdict. Although landowners in inverse condemnation actions are entitled to prejudgment interest under the just compensation clause of article 1, section 26 of the Missouri Constitution, the issue of prejudgment interest must be presented to the jury and included in its verdict or the authority for the trial court to add interest to the jury’s verdict in its judgment must be provided by statute. Because the Akers failed to present the issue of prejudgment interest to the jury and no specific statute exists allowing the trial court to add prejudgment interest to the jury’s verdict, the Akers are not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest on their inverse condemnation claim.
(3) The trial court did not err in denying the City’s request for the submission of a converse jury instruction seeking a verdict in its favor because the City’s instruction was an affirmative converse instruction that was contrary to established law in light of the evidence presented at trial.
(4) The City is not entitled to relief on the basis of cumulative error because the claims of error were either not preserved for review on appeal or were found to be without merit, so there was no error to be considered cumulatively.